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ABSTRACT 
We use the theory of organizational ecology to study how governmental venture capital (GVC) affects 
the investment behavior of private venture capital (PVC). Because of its objectives and dominant 
competencies, GVC is a unique organizational species that occupies a different niche than and is 
conceived to establish mutualistic relations with PVC. Accordingly, the greater the presence of GVC 
in a VC ecosystem, the more PVC investors should be attracted toward GVC’s niche. We consider 
several relevant niche dimensions at the company (age and size), industry (biotechnology) and 
regional (competitiveness) levels. Our analysis of 1,239 PVC investments in Europe confirms most 
of our predictions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Governmental venture capital (GVC) is a government-owned investment vehicle that is structured 
like a venture capital (VC) fund. GVC funds have been created in many countries, including the US 
(Lerner, 1999), Australia (Cumming & Johan, 2009), Canada (Cumming & Macintosh, 2006), and 
Europe (Bertoni, Colombo, & Quas, 2015). They have a mandate to close the gap left by private VC 
(PVC) in funding innovative start-ups, to promote the creation of new jobs and to foster local 
development (Colombo, Cumming, & Vismara, 2016). The aim of this paper is to assess how PVC 
investors’ investment behavior is altered by the presence of GVC.  
The literature has addressed this important issue by studying whether GVC stimulates (crowds 
in) or displaces (crowds out) PVC investments. Most studies investigate whether the aggregate 
volume of VC investments from private sources increases or decreases when GVC is introduced in a 
given market, obtaining mixed results (Armour & Cumming, 2006; Brander, Du, & Hellmann, 2015; 
Cumming & Macintosh, 2006; del-Palacio, Zhang, & Sole, 2012; Jeng & Wells, 2000; Leleux & 
Surlemont, 2003). Only a few studies use firm-level data, showing that companies that receive GVC 
are more likely both to receive PVC (Guerini & Quas, 2016) and to receive a larger amount of VC 
funding (Brander et al., 2015).  
GVC may alter the VC ecosystem not only by stimulating PVC investments but also by 
inducing PVC investors to target different companies (i.e., to invest in companies they would neglect 
in the absence of GVC). The literature has not systematically analyzed this phenomenon, with the 
exception of Kovner and Lerner (2015), who show that the presence of community development VC 
– a type of VC that has objectives similar to those of GVC – increases PVC investors’ propensity to 
invest in underserved regions.  
In this work, we use the lens of organizational ecology to investigate how GVC’s density in 
a VC ecosystem influences the characteristics of the companies that are the target of PVC 
investments. Organizational ecology predicts that different organizational species in the same 
ecosystem may interact and that this interaction may determine changes to how those species “earn a 
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living,” i.e., to their niches. These theoretical lenses are particularly suitable for modeling the 
relationship between GVC and PVC. GVC and PVC differ markedly in terms of their objectives and 
dominant competencies and, therefore, can be treated as distinct organizational species (McKelvey, 
1982). The theory of organizational ecology predicts that the result of the interaction between two 
species depends upon the extent to which their niches differ and upon the type of relationship 
(competitive vs. mutualistic) that the two species have. Building on Echols and Tsai (2005), we define 
the niches of GVC and PVC based on the specific combination of the investment opportunities 
pursued by the two species. Because of its political mandate, GVC invests in companies that, 
compared to PVC’s typical targets, tend to be smaller, in earlier stages of development, in industries 
with longer time to market and more severe information asymmetries, and in more economically 
disadvantaged regions (Bertoni & Tykvová, 2015; Kovner & Lerner, 2015; Mason & Harrison, 2003). 
Moreover, the goal of creating a GVC fund is to promote PVC development in areas of the economy 
in which its limited presence generates a funding gap. Accordingly, PVC and GVC have niches that 
overlap (as testified by the existence of syndicated investments between the two investment types) 
but only partially, because some investment targets that are attractive to GVC are not a natural 
investment target for PVC. To attract PVC investments to these companies, GVC must establish with 
PVC what is known in organizational ecology as a mutualistic relationship, i.e., a relationship in 
which the presence of one species is beneficial for the other species. We predict that if a mutualistic 
relationship exists between GVC and PVC, a higher density of GVC in a given VC ecosystem will 
make PVC investors more likely to invest in companies that are the typical target of GVC and that 
they would neglect in the absence of GVC. 
In the empirical section of the paper, we observe VC ecosystems that differ in GVC’s density 
and study the extent to which the PVC niche is affected by the presence of GVC. We exploit the fact 
that national borders represent for VC investors what geographic barriers represent for ecological 
populations. Institutional characteristics shape national VC markets (Bruton, Fried, & Manigart, 
2005; Jeng & Wells, 2000), and VC investors without previous experience in cross-border deals 
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(Meuleman & Wright, 2011) and specific human resources (Manigart et al., 2007) are unlikely to 
invest internationally. We thus consider different European countries as different ecosystems.1 
Europe is an interesting research setting because GVC plays a much more important role in Europe 
than in the US (Bertoni et al., 2015), and the extent of its presence is heterogeneous both across 
European countries and, for each country, over time.  
Our econometric analysis takes advantage of the VICO database, which was created by the 
VICO research project, promoted by the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme (Bertoni 
& Martí, 2011). We use information on 1,239 first investments made between 1994 and 2004 by 676 
PVC investors in 560 high-tech companies that were less than 10 years old at the time of the 
investment and located in seven European countries. The VICO database represents an ideal choice 
for our analysis because it offers an unbiased representation of the niches of PVC (and GVC), 
allowing us to compare seven VC ecosystems over a 10-year period.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The Organizational Ecology View of Governmental and Private Venture Capital 
In the organizational ecology literature, populations are collections of organizations that share the 
same form in a particular location and time period (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Manigart (1994) was 
the first to consider VC as a population of organizations in the sense meant by Hannan and Freeman 
(1977) and the first to study how the density of VC firms affects the founding rates of new VC firms. 
Echols and Tsai (2005) also use these theoretical lenses and focus on the product and process niches 
of VC investors, defined according to the type of investment opportunities that are pursued.   
                                                 
1 The fact that in the observation period, VC markets in different European countries can be considered as distinct 
ecosystems, is indirectly documented by the introduction of the European venture capital passport in 2013 (European 
Parliament, 2013), which aimed to reduce the high barriers to cross-border intra-European VC investments (European 
Commission, 2007). This effort to foster cross-border VC investments is justified by the empirical evidence of a stronger 
positive effect of foreign VC investors on entrepreneurial ventures, for instance in terms of long term growth (Devigne, 
Vanacker, Manigart, & Paeleman, 2011), ability to stop escalation commitment (Devigne, Manigart, & Wright, 2016), 
and exit opportunities (Bertoni & Groh, 2014). 
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A population of organizations can be partitioned into different organizational species, which 
are subsets of the overall population characterized by different objectives and dominant competencies 
(McKelvey, 1982). Because of these differences, organizational species may occupy different niches 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977; McPherson, 1983). The first step of our theoretical reasoning is therefore 
to argue that GVC and PVC represent different organizational species and, thus, tend to occupy 
different niches. PVC investors’ primary objective is to maximize the economic returns from their 
investments. Accordingly, their niche favors investments in companies that have high risk-adjusted 
expected return, are less exposed to information asymmetries, and enjoy advantageous environmental 
conditions. GVC funds have instead been created to alleviate capital market failures arising from 
limited supply of VC. Their aim is to provide funding for companies that are subject to more severe 
information asymmetries and higher investment risk (Brander et al., 2015; Colombo, Cumming, & 
Vismara, 2016) and, thus, despite their potential, experience serious difficulties in obtaining the 
capital they need. Moreover, GVC is often motivated by broader political and social objectives, such 
as the creation of new jobs and the development of peripheral and economically lagging regions that 
lack an adequate local supply of VC (Lerner, 1999, 2002).  
The dominant competencies of GVC also differ from those of PVC. Because of its political 
objectives and inclination to invest in riskier and informationally more opaque companies located in 
peripheral areas, GVC finds it difficult to attract and retain talented investment managers 
(Jääskeläinen, Maula, & Murray, 2007). Hence, GVC’s ability to provide portfolio companies with 
adequate coaching is more limited than that of PVC (Luukkonen, Deschryvere, & Bertoni, 2013). 
Conversely, because of its close relationship with public bodies, GVC is ideally placed to help 
portfolio companies obtain additional public support (e.g., Colombo, D’Adda, & Pirelli, 2016).2  
                                                 
2 GVC is, in turn, a collection of different types of investors that potentially constitute sub-species, including funds owned 
by national governments, regional authorities or public universities. PVC is also a collection of different sub-species, 
including independent VC, corporate VC, and bank-affiliated VC (Bertoni et al., 2015; Dimov & Gedajlovic, 2010; 
Mayer, Schoors, & Yafeh, 2005). However, we focus on aspects that all GVC and PVC investors have in common, making 
them two different species: the fact that PVC investments are driven by economic objectives (e.g., financial returns, 
technology sourcing, demand externalities), whereas GVC investments also have political objectives. 
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The second step of our theoretical reasoning focuses on the interaction between GVC and 
PVC. When different species coexist in the same ecosystem, their mutual interaction will result in a 
shift in their niches (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; McPherson, 1983). There are two types of interactions 
between species: mutualistic and competitive. In a mutualistic relationship, two species benefit from 
each other’s presence, and their niches tend to converge, maximizing interaction (Hannan & Carroll, 
1992). In a competitive relationship, the opposite happens: two species compete for the same 
resources and their niches tend to diverge, minimizing interaction (McPherson & Ranger-Moore, 
1991). The organizational ecology theory suggests that the intensity of mutualistic or competitive 
interaction between species depends on those species’ density in the ecosystem, i.e., “the number of 
organizations it contains” (Hannan & Carroll, 1992, page 5; see also Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Dobrev, 
Kim, & Hannan, 2001 and Manigart, 1994, who applied this concept in the context of VC). The higher 
the density of a species in an ecosystem, the more other species will shift toward (mutualism) or away 
from (competition) its niche.  
We have mentioned that GVC has the political mandate of filling the funding gap left by PVC, 
nurturing entrepreneurship and contributing to economic growth. To accomplish this mandate, GVC 
not only must insist on a niche that represents investments neglected by PVC but also must attract 
PVC to those investments. Therefore, GVC must create a mutualistic relationship with PVC, 
generating a crowding-in effect. Several factors underpin the mutualistic nature of the relationship 
between PVC and GVC. The first factor is risk-sharing in syndication. PVC investors may syndicate 
with GVC to enter new segments of the market while keeping the investment risk low (Jääskeläinen, 
2012). The denser the GVC in an ecosystem, the more PVC can reap the benefits of syndication and, 
therefore, shift its niche toward GVCs. Second, organization ecology suggests that higher density 
leads to the greater legitimacy of an organizational species (Carroll & Hannan, 1989), implying that 
its actions are perceived as socially acceptable, appropriate and even desirable (e.g., Suchman, 1995). 
Hence, an increase in GVC’s density in a VC ecosystem likely leads to a greater propensity by PVC 
to invest like a GVC (i.e., moving toward its niche) because the latter is perceived as more legitimate. 
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Third, and relatedly, the increased legitimacy that is associated with the increased density of GVC in 
a VC ecosystem will also intensify the strength of the signal GVC conveys when investing in a 
particular market niche. These signals decrease information asymmetries and, therefore, reduce 
screening costs for PVC (Guerini & Quas, 2016; Martí & Quas, 2017), attracting it to GVC’s niche.  
One important element of our identification strategy is that GVC’s density will only affect 
PVC in the same VC ecosystem. Therefore, if we observe VC ecosystems with different GVC’s 
densities, we can compare the niche of PVC across them. To this end, we will assume that countries 
represent distinct ecosystems for VC. This approach is particularly relevant in Europe during our 
observation period (1994-2004). In this period, the European VC market was fragmented because 
differences in administrative, regulatory and national tax policies created serious difficulties in cross-
country fundraising and investments (European Commission, 2007). Additionally, GVC investors 
predominantly invest domestically (Bertoni et al., 2015); therefore, it is unlikely that they can 
influence the behavior of PVC investors abroad. To assess the influence of GVC on PVC investors’ 
investment behavior in the same VC ecosystem, we therefore exploit variations in the extent of the 
presence of GVC across European countries and over time. 
How GVC affects the niche of PVC 
To empirically test the extent to which GVC’s density affects the PVC niche, we must identify some 
key dimensions along which the investments of the two organizational species are likely to differ. To 
do so, we build upon the extant literature (Dimov & Gedajlovic, 2010; Mayer et al., 2005) and identify 
four main dimensions that characterize investee companies: age, size, industry and region.  
Information asymmetries make access to external financing very problematic for young and 
small high-tech companies (Hall & Lerner, 2010). These companies combine the need for substantial 
financial resources to fund investments with difficult access to debt capital because of their short 
track record and lack of collateral (Berger & Udell, 1990). Young and small high-tech companies 
therefore must rely on equity financing (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002) and would greatly benefit from 
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obtaining VC. However, they often experience a severe funding gap because the information 
opaqueness of their innovation-based activities, the difficulties of rapidly scaling up their operations, 
and the associated investment risks deter PVC investments. Filling this funding gap is the objective 
of numerous governmental programs (Lerner, 2002). GVC’s politically related objectives and 
dominant competencies make small, young high-tech companies a natural target of their investments. 
Hence, GVC is more focused than PVC on this type of company (Bertoni et al., 2015). If GVC is 
successful in creating a mutualistic relationship with PVC, the more GVC is present in a country in a 
given year, the more the niche of PVC should shift toward high-tech companies that are small and 
young. Hypotheses H1 and H2 follow.  
Hypothesis 1: PVC’s tendency to invest in young high-tech companies will increase with 
GVC’s density in the country. 
Hypothesis 2: PVC’s tendency to invest in small high-tech companies will increase with 
GVC’s density in the country. 
Biotechnology plays a particularly important role for GVC. Innovation in biotechnology requires 
large financial investments and a very long time to break even (DiMasi & Grabowski, 2007). 
Moreover, tacit, specialized knowledge embedded in the human capital of scientists is critical for the 
success of these science-based companies(Junkunc, 2007)(Junkunc, 2007)(Junkunc, 2007)(Junkunc, 
2007)(Junkunc, 2007)(Junkunc, 2007)(Junkunc, 2007)(Junkunc, 2007)(Junkunc, 2007), exacerbating 
issues of asymmetric information and moral hazard and making it difficult to obtain financing from 
private sources (Junkunc & Eckhardt, 2009).  Because of this substantial funding gap, the role of 
government support is extremely important in determining the success of a country’s biotechnology 
sector, which explains why this sector ranks high on policymakers’ agenda (Giesecke, 2000; Kang & 
Park, 2012). Moreover, biotech companies require significant non-financial (human, alliance) capital 
that is difficult to find and key to winning innovation races (Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997). It is 
especially important to attract PVC in this sector because of its ability to provide these key resources 
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and build winners (Baum & Silverman, 2004). Accordingly, if GVC creates mutualistic relationships 
with PVC, we expect that a larger presence of GVC in a country shifts PVC’s niche toward biotech 
companies, leading to hypothesis H3. 
Hypothesis 3: PVC’s tendency to invest in biotech companies will increase with GVC’s 
density in the country. 
GVC often has the explicit objective of fostering the economic development of less-favored regions. 
GVC is also ideally placed to help companies located in these regions access other policy schemes 
aimed at regional development (such as the structural funds of the European Union). This clearly 
differentiates GVC’s niche from PVC’s niche. Indeed, PVC is highly clustered in a few geographical 
areas that are generally the most economically and financially advanced (Chen, Gompers, Kovner, & 
Lerner, 2010; Powell, Koput, Bowie, & Smith-Doerr, 2002). Spatial clustering is strengthened by 
PVC investors’ tendency to invest locally, exploiting syndication networks and circumscribed 
information flows (Cumming & Dai, 2010). Driven by the evidence linking the presence of PVC to 
local economic growth (Samila & Sorenson, 2011), GVC has been used – sometimes attracting 
criticism (Mason & Harrison, 2003) – as a means of fostering PVC development in regions that are 
underserved by PVC. Accordingly, we expect that the greater the presence of GVC within a given 
country, the more the establishment of mutualistic relationships between PVC and GVC will drive 
PVC’s niche toward less-favored regions. Hypothesis H4 follows. 
Hypothesis 4: PVC’s tendency to invest in less-developed regions will increase with 
GVC’s density in the country. 
METHODS 
Research Setting 
To test our hypotheses, we use the database created by the VICO research project, supported by the 
7th Framework Programme and promoted by the European Commission (Bertoni & Martí, 2011). The 
database collects information on VC investments in 759 European high-tech companies over the 
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period 1994-2004. These companies were owner-managed when founded, are located in 7 European 
countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom), operate in 
high-tech sectors3 and received their first VC round by their 10th year of existence. 
VICO data on VC investments were collected via random extraction from commercial 
databases (i.e., Thomson One, VC-PRO, and Zephyr) and country-specific proprietary databases. The 
data were cross-checked with those available from public sources by a central data processing unit. 
Through accurate data cleaning, VICO overcomes commercial databases’ well-known deficiencies 
in the coverage of VC outside the US, including the overrepresentation of independent VC 
investments and the mischaracterization of GVC investments (Bertoni et al., 2015; Da Gbadji, Gailly, 
& Schwienbacher, 2015). Therefore, we are confident that VICO offers an unbiased representation 
of the niches of PVC (and GVC) and is especially suitable for our analysis.4 
The VICO database provides complete information on 1,239 first investments made by 676 
PVC investors in 560 companies, which we use as our unit of analysis. Table 1 shows the distribution 
of the sample of PVC investments by sector and location of the company and investment year.  
[Table 1 around here] 
Variables and Model 
                                                 
3 VICO considers the following sectors: nanotechnology, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, computers, electronic 
components, telecommunication equipment, precision, optical and medical instruments, robotics, aerospace, software, 
telecommunications services, internet and multimedia services, web publishing, renewable energies, R&D and 
engineering services. For further details on the VICO database, see Bertoni and Martì Pellon (2011). 
4 To verify this claim, we formally tested the randomness of the VICO database for a selection of VC investors. For each 
of the four investor types included in VICO – independent, corporate, bank and governmental VC, we selected the investor 
with the highest number of investee companies according to VICO. The selected investors are 3i (independent VC in 
UK), Innovacom (corporate VC in France), Fortis (bank-affiliated VC in Belgium) and BPI (formerly CDC, GVC in 
France), which together are responsible for 117 first investments in our sample. For those investors, we collected as much 
information as possible on their investment history using Thomson One, Zephyr, Crunchbase and other Internet sources. 
Overall, we found 497 first investments by those investors between 1994 and 2004 in companies younger than 10 years 
at their first VC round, operating in high-tech sectors and located in the 7 countries covered by VICO. We believe this 
list comes very close to the population of investments made by the selected investors. For each investor, we compared 
the distribution of the investments in this population with that of the investments included in VICO along the following 
dimensions: company age at the time of the investment, sector of operation, and region of localization. We do not find 
any significant differences (the results of this analysis are available from the authors upon request).  
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Our analysis includes four dependent variables that correspond to the four niche dimensions under 
consideration. The first dimension is the maturity of companies, measured by their age at the time of 
the investment. We generate a dummy variable Young that is equal to 1 if the investment is in a 
company less than 3 years old. The second niche dimension, company size, is captured by the dummy 
variable Micro, which – consistent with European Commission (2015) – is equal to 1 for target 
companies with fewer than 10 employees at the time of the investment. The third niche dimension is 
captured by the dummy variable Biotech, which identifies companies operating in biotechnology 
(Nace Rev 2. Codes 721X). The fourth niche dimension is the competitiveness of the region in which 
the investee company is located. This variable is measured using the Regional Competitiveness Index 
(RCI), an index computed at the regional (i.e., NUTS2) level by the European Commission (Annoni 
& Dijkstra, 2013) and based on several indicators that reflect the development, efficiency and 
innovation of European regions measured between 2006 and 2011. We dichotomize the index and 
generate the variable LowRCI, which is equal to 1 for investments in regions with RCI lower than the 
median for the group of regions included in our sample (results are similar when taking the mean 
value as threshold). Because all our dependent variables are dummy variables, we resort to Probit 
specifications and we cluster standard errors on VC investors (results are unchanged without 
clustering of standard errors). 
Our key independent variable is GVC’s density in each country and year in our sample. To 
measure it, we retrieved from Thomson One all the first investments made by VC investors in high-
tech companies.5 We then identified GVC investors. To correct for Thomson One’s tendency to 
misclassify GVC investors, we extracted from Capital IQ the list of European VC investors whose 
parent company is owned by government entities and double-checked their governmental nature 
                                                 
5 High-tech companies include all those companies that belong to the following sectors of the VEIC classification used 
by Thomson Reuters: Information Technology, Biotechnology, and Pharmaceuticals. Results are similar if we also 
include companies in Medical Diagnostics, Medical Therapeutics and Medical/Health Products of the VEIC 
classification. The data were downloaded in December 2016. 
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using information available on their websites. We used this information to complement the list of 
investors classified as “Government Affiliated Programs,” “Development Programs” or “University 
Programs” in Thomson One (results are similar if we use the original classification by Thomson One). 
We computed, in each country and each year, the percentage of GVC investors (%GVC) as the 
number of active GVC investors located in the focal country divided by the number of all active VC 
investors in the same country and lagged by one year. The coefficient of the variable is captured in 
the extent to which PVC’s tendency to invest in categories of companies (i.e., young, small, biotech 
and located in less-developed regions, respectively) is affected by GVC’s density in the country.  
Some additional variables are included in the analysis to control for the fact that the 
positioning of a PVC investment along each niche dimension may be influenced by investment-, 
investor- or country-specific characteristics. The dummy variable FirstRound indicates whether the 
investment was the first VC investment ever received by the company, whereas the dummy variable 
Syndicated indicates the investments that are syndicated. Centrality is defined at the investor-year 
level and captures the extent to which the focal PVC investor is connected to other well-connected 
VC investors. We follow Hallen et al.’s (2014) approach to measuring the eigenvector centrality of 
the focal investor in the Thomson One database. We control for the development of national VC 
markets using the variable VConGDP, which gives the amount of early-stage VC investments as a 
percentage of GDP in each country and year (source: EVCA). Country and time dummy variables are 
also included in the analysis. Industry dummies are included in all models except the one in which 
Biotech is the dependent variable.  
Table 2 illustrates the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables used in 
the econometric analysis. With respect to the niche dimensions, 52.9% of our sample PVC 
investments are in young companies, 33.4% are in small companies, 20.2% are in biotech companies 
and 23.5% are in companies located in regions with low competitiveness.  
[Table 2 around here] 
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RESULTS 
Main results 
Table 3 presents our main econometric results. The sign and the significance of the control variables 
are overall in line with our expectations. FirstRound is positively associated with Young and Micro, 
which means that first-round VC investments tend to be in younger and smaller companies compared 
to follow-on investments. Syndication is less common in Micro investments and more frequent in 
Biotech, consistent with the fact that syndication is used more when the capital invested is larger. 
VConGDP and Centrality are negatively associated with Micro, suggesting that more central VC 
investors and investors in more-developed VC markets are less likely to invest in smaller companies. 
As to our main independent variable, the coefficients of %GVC are positive and significant in 
models for Young (p-value<0.01), Micro (p-value<0.001) and LowRCI (p-value<0.01). The same 
holds true for the marginal effects (equal to 0.403 for Young, 0.432 for Micro and 0.318 for LowRCI, 
all with p-value<0.01 or better). When GVC is better represented in a country, PVC investors are 
more inclined to invest in younger companies, smaller companies, and companies located in less-
competitive regions. The magnitude of the effects of GVC’s density in the focal country on the 
probability that PVC invests in younger, smaller companies located in less-competitive regions is 
also sizable. If we consider an “average” investment in our sample (i.e., all continuous control 
variables at their mean value and all categorical variables at their mode), when GVC investors are 
6.3% of the total number of VC investors (15th percentile of the distribution of the %GVC variable), 
the PVC’s estimated probability of investing in young companies is 42.2%, its estimated probability 
of investing in micro companies is 17.5% and its estimated probability of investing in less-
competitive regions is 12.3%. When GVC investors instead represent 23.8% of the VC population 
(corresponding to the 85th percentile of the %GVC variable), these probabilities rise to 50.5%, 25.3% 
and 19.1% (i.e., an increase equal to 8.3 percentage points for young companies, 7.7 percentage points 
for micro companies and 6.7 percentage points for companies located in less-competitive regions). 
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These results confirm hypotheses H1, H2 and H4. In contrast, we do not find support for hypothesis 
H3: %GVC does not exert any significant impact on PVC’s tendency to invest in Biotech.  
[Table 3 around here]  
Robustness tests 
Our results are robust to a series of modifications in the econometric models. First, we measure 
GVC’s density using the number of investments (instead of the number of investors) in each country 
and year (source: Thomson One database). Second, two of our dependent variables are significantly 
correlated: Young and Micro have a correlation of 0.29. Therefore, we use a bi-probit specification. 
Third, we change the measures that we use for some of our dimensions. For firm maturity, we 
substitute the variable Young with the variable Seed, which is 1 for investments in the seed stage. For 
regional development, we substitute LowRCI with the variable OutsideVCHubs, which is equal to 1 
for investments that are located outside of VC hubs, defined as the top 10 regions (NUTS2) in Europe 
per number of VC investments in the sample period (source: Thomson One, regions identified using 
reported addresses of VC investors). Fourth, we repeat our analysis dropping from our sample all 
investments by corporate and bank-affiliated VC and considering only independent VC investors as 
PVC species. The results obtained after each of the abovementioned modifications in the model are 
qualitatively similar to those illustrated in the previous section and are available from the authors 
upon request. 
Additional results 
The European VC industry has changed during the period of our study, potentially affecting the 
relationships among VC types. Therefore, we study whether the association between GVC’s density 
and PVC investors’ investment behavior is different before and after the Internet bubble of 2000, 
which is the most important event for the VC industry during our observation period. We repeat the 
analysis by interacting the variable %GVC with two terms, one for each sub-period: pre-bubble and 
post-bubble. In Table 4, we show the results of this analysis. A Wald test (reported in the last row of 
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the table) does not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of Pre-bubble x %GVC and Post-
bubble x %GVC are equal at conventional significance levels along the Young, Micro and LowRCI 
dimension. This result suggests that the relationship between the presence of GVC and the behavior 
of PVC investors that was illustrated above was at work in both sub-periods analyzed. In addition, in 
the pre-bubble period, GVC’s density is positively and significantly (p-value<0.05) related to the 
likelihood that PVC investors select biotech companies as investment targets, as predicted by 
hypothesis H3. This relation vanishes in the post-bubble period. One possible explanation is that the 
maturing of the biotech industry over time may have rendered the funding gap of which biotech 
companies suffer less severe in the most recent period (on this aspect, see, e.g., Higgins, Stephan, & 
Thursby, 2011).    
[Table 4 around here] 
Next, we shed some light on the mechanisms through which GVC’s density influences the 
characteristics of PVC investment, considering the role of syndication between GVC and PVC 
investors.  We split our sample in two sub-groups: investments in which the PVC investor syndicated 
with a GVC investor (i.e., a GVC investor and a PVC investor invested in the same company in the 
same year) and investments in which no GVC was involved. We repeat the analysis for the two sub-
samples. In the sub-sample of PVC investments in which GVC was not involved, we substitute 
Syndicated with the variable SyndicatedWithPVC, which is equal to 1 if the investment is a syndicate 
with other PVC investors. Results are shown in Table 5. Panel A indicates that when GVC investors 
are involved in the investment, GVC’s density has a positive impact on PVC’s tendency to invest in 
younger and smaller companies (p-value<0.001 and 0.01, respectively). Panel B shows that along the 
Micro and LowRCI dimensions, the effect of %GVC is also significant in deals in which GVC 
investors were not directly involved (p-value<0.05 and 0.01, respectively).   
[Table 5 around here] 
Thus far, we have documented that the presence of GVC in a given country influences the 
investments behavior of PVC investors. It is interesting to show that, instead, the niche of GVC 
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investors is not affected by their own density. For this purpose, we repeat the analysis on a sample of 
284 GVC investments extracted from the VICO database. Table 6 shows the results of this analysis. 
The variable %GVC is never significant, with only the partial exception of the Micro niche dimension, 
where it has a positive and weakly significant coefficient (p-value<0.1). We conclude that unlike 
PVC investments, GVC investment characteristics are not related to GVC’s density.  
[Table 6 around here] 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this work, we have used the theoretical lenses of organizational ecology to examine how GVC’s 
density influences PVC investors’ investment behavior in a VC ecosystem. We have argued that GVC 
is a different species from PVC because of GVC’s political objectives and distinct dominant 
competencies. Hence, GVC occupies a different niche from PVC. Moreover, it is inherent in the 
political mandate of GVC to establish mutualistic relationships with PVC, attracting PVC investors 
to companies they would otherwise neglect because of informational opaqueness, excessive 
investment risk and peripheral location. The strength of this attraction depends on GVC’s density in 
the ecosystem. To test our predictions, we considered a random sample of VC investments in 7 
European countries over the period 1994-2004. Our econometric results showed that in countries and 
years in which GVC was more strongly represented, PVC investors were more likely to invest in 
younger, smaller companies located in less-competitive regions. Because these companies are the 
typical target of GVC investors and are unattractive to PVC investors, we argue that these results 
confirm that GVC and PVC behave as organizational species in a mutualistic relationship. We also 
showed that syndication is one mechanism that GVC uses to attract PVC in its niche, but not the only 
one: even PVC investors that do not syndicate with GVC are more likely to invest in less-competitive 
regions and smaller companies when GVC’s density is greater.  
This paper offers two main contributions to the VC literature. First, several recent studies have 
examined the impact of the GVC programs that have been set up by governments of several countries 
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with the aim of closing the funding gap left by PVC. These studies have shown that in the effects of 
GVC financing on portfolio companies have been limited (Colombo, Cumming, & Vismara, 2016). 
Scholars have also questioned whether GVC crowds out PVC instead of attracting it to companies 
that need equity financing. The evidence at an aggregate level of analysis is mixed. The findings in 
Armour and Cumming (2006) and Cumming and Macintosh (2006) are consistent with a crowding-
out effect in North America and Europe. Conversely, Jeng and Wells (2000), Leleux and Surlemont 
(2003), del-Palacio et al. (2012) and Brander et al. (2015) show that GVC positively affects the 
development of the VC industry. Studies using firm-level data also offer a positive view. Brander et 
al. (Brander et al., 2015) show that if GVC and PVC are both present in a company, the company 
receives a larger amount of VC investment than with GVC or PVC only. Guerini and Quas (2016) 
find that receiving GVC makes a firm three times more likely to receive PVC. Our study extends this 
latter stream of literature by investigating the changes triggered by the presence of GVC in a focal 
country in PVC investors’ investment behavior located in the same country (on this topic, see also 
Kovner and Lerner, 2015). Our findings show that in countries in which the presence of GVC is 
stronger, PVC investors are more inclined to invest in firms that they tend to neglect in the absence 
of GVC (young, small, located in less-competitive regions). 
Second, our study contributes to a small stream of studies that have applied the theoretical 
lens of the organizational ecology perspective to analyze VC, notably Manigart (1994) and Echols 
and Tsai (2005). In this study, we combine their theoretical perspectives. We discuss the niches of 
GVC and PVC, defined by the different characteristics of the companies in which these two VC 
species tend to invest, and consider how GVC’s density influences PVC investors’ behavior, as 
reflected in their niche.  
This work has some limitations that open interesting avenues for future research. First, for the 
sake of brevity, we consider PVC a unique species. This species is quite heterogeneous, as it includes 
investors with different ownership and governance (Dimov & Gedajlovic, 2010), investment 
experience and network embeddedness. Scholars may wish to investigate whether differences among 
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PVC investors influence the strength of the mutualistic relationships they establish with GVC, or 
even give rise to competitive relationships. Similarly, not all GVC investors are alike (Jääskeläinen 
et al., 2007), and the design of GVC programs may influence the relationships between GVC and 
PVC. Second, we document empirically the existence of mutualistic relationships between GVC and 
PVC and show that they are not exclusively driven by syndication between the two investor types. If 
more detailed information were available, researchers could more closely examine the mechanisms 
that drive changes in PVC investment behavior, such as the certification effects of GVC investments 
or incentives to invest in particular companies or regions. Third, our work is based on 7 European 
countries. Extensions of this analysis to a larger number of countries, possibly including countries 
outside of Europe, would enable an examination of how institutional characteristics (e.g., investor 
protection, development of the stock market and the market for corporate control) moderate the 
intensity of the observed changes in PVC investments associated with GVC’s density. Finally, data 
limitations force us to focus on four niche dimensions in this study. If additional information were 
available on the target companies selected by PVC investors, for instance, concerning the radicalness 
of the technology they were developing or their access to alternative financing channels such as 
business angels, crowdfunding or public subsidies, our analysis of the interaction between GVC and 
PVC could be made more comprehensive. Furthermore, future research may adopt a more detailed 
characterization of the niches’ dimensions. For instance, while we consider companies operating in 
biotechnology as a single niche, it has been shown that biotechnology is a very heterogeneous sector, 
characterized by several fields, which could be considered as distinct sub-niches (Knockaert, 
Manigart, Cattoir, & Verstraete, 2015). The non-significance of our results along the biotech niche 
dimension could be driven by this limitation.   
Despite these limitations, our study has interesting policy implications. Our results highlight 
a positive effect of GVC that has previously been overlooked. Taking into consideration the widely 
documented positive effects of PVC on portfolio companies (Da Rin, Hellmann, & Puri, 2013), the 
fact that the presence of GVC makes PVC more inclined to invest in companies it would otherwise 
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neglect is good news for policymakers, and may offset the limited direct effects of GVC on portfolio 
companies. Accordingly, it would probably be wise to redefine the additionality of GVC programs in 
terms of their ability to redirect the “smart money” provided by PVC investors to companies that are 
most negatively affected by capital market imperfections. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Distribution of the sample PVC investments by sector of operation and 
location of the investee companies and investment year 
  No %   No % 
Sector of operation of the company  Investment year 
Internet 192 15.50  1994 1 0.08 
Telecommunication services 65 5.25  1995 1 0.08 
Biotech and pharmaceuticals 306 24.70  1996 9 0.73 
ICT manufacturing a 213 17.19  1997 31 2.50 
Software 431 34.79  1998 56 4.52 
Other high-tech industries 32 2.58  1999 116 9.36 
Total 1239 100.00  2000 303 24.46 
    2001 250 20.18 
Location of the company  2002 203 13.33 
Belgium 135 10.90  2003 152 12.27 
Finland 76 6.13  2004 157 12.67 
France 322 25.99  Total 1239 100.00 
Germany 252 20.34     
Italy 43 3.47     
Spain 47 3.79     
United Kingdom 364 29.38     
Total 1239 100.00     
a This category includes electronic components, computers, telecommunication equipment, 
electronic, medical and optical instruments 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
  Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 FirstRound 1,239 0.665 0.472 0.000 1.000 1.00        
2 Syndicated 1,239 0.707 0.455 0.000 1.000 -0.25 1.00       
3 Centrality 1,239 0.007 0.020 0.000 0.138 -0.07 0.09 1.00      
4 VConGDP 1,239 0.048 0.031 0.003 0.105 0.11 0.14 0.07 1.00     
5 %GVC 1,239 0.159 0.121 0.000 1.000 -0.08 -0.12 0.00 -0.26 1.00 
   
6 Young 1,239 0.529 0.499 0.000 1.000 0.32 -0.07 -0.02 0.07 0.05 1.00 
  
7 Micro 860 0.334 0.472 0.000 1.000 0.32 -0.17 -0.13 -0.10 0.15 0.29 1.00 
 
8 Biotech 1,239 0.202 0.401 0.000 1.000 0.03 0.12 -0.03 -0.08 0.03 0.06 0.11 1.00 
9 LowRCI 1,239 0.235 0.424 0.000 1.000 0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.29 0.19 -0.04 0.12 -0.14 
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Table 3: Results of the econometric analysis: Impact of GVC’s density on the 
characteristics of PVC investments 
  I II III IV 
Dependent Variable Young Micro Biotech LowRCI 
FirstRound 0.984 *** 1.019 *** 0.086  0.166  
 (0.089)  (0.113)  (0.101)  (0.109)  
Syndicated -0.060  -0.389 ** 0.351 ** -0.046  
 (0.097)  (0.120)  (0.111)  (0.133)  
Centrality 0.275  -6.975 * -2.095  -2.431  
 (2.267)  (3.374)  (2.297)  (2.508)  
VConGDP 0.970  -7.212 ** -2.993  -2.850  
 (1.685)  (2.524)  (1.834)  (2.048)  
%GVC 1.196 ** 1.522 *** 0.467  1.616 *** 
 (0.450)  (0.453)  (0.369)  (0.487)  
Constant -0.296  0.262  -1.097 *** -1.609 *** 
 (0.207)  (0.285)  (0.217)  (0.381)  
N 1239   860   1239   1239   
2 [DoF] 200.96 [17] *** 180.91 [17] *** 81.74 [12] *** 4827.58[17] *** 
Pseudo R2 0.144  0.212  0.083  0.353  
The table shows coefficients and standard errors of four probit regressions, whose dependent variable is 
specified in the first row. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered for the 676 investors. Country, time and 
industry (except for model III) dummies are included in the analysis but are omitted from the table. The highest 
average VIF is 2.64, for model II.  *p-value<0.05; **p-value<0.01; ***p-value<0.001.  
Table 4: Additional evidence: Pre and Post Internet Bubble 
  I II III IV 
Dependent Variable Young Micro Biotech LowRCI 
FirstRound 0.989 *** 1.021 *** 0.082  0.166  
 (0.089)  (0.114)  (0.101)  (0.109)  
Syndicated -0.062  -0.391 ** 0.355 ** -0.048  
 (0.097)  (0.120)  (0.111)  (0.134)  
Centrality 0.088  -7.066 * -1.795  -2.447  
 (2.300)  (3.396)  (2.314)  (2.510)  
VConGDP 1.102  -7.155 ** -3.062 † -2.827  
 (1.689)  (2.519)  (1.838)  (2.057)  
Pre-bubble x %GVC () 0.676  1.282 * 1.165 * 1.493 *  
(0.582)  (0.581)  (0.553)  (0.629)  
Post-bubble x %GVC () 1.938 ** 1.744 * -0.441  1.788 * 
 (0.697)  (0.692)  (0.565)  (0.828)  
Constant -0.299  0.275  -1.113 *** -1.609 *** 
 (0.209)  (0.286)  (0.224)  (0.381)  
N 1239  860  1239  1239  
2 [DoF] 205.03 [18] *** 186.27 [18] *** 84.63 [13] *** 5053.22 [18] *** 
Pseudo R2 0.145  0.212  0.086  0.353  
Test = 1.775   0.255   3.780 † 0.077   
The table shows coefficients and standard errors of four probit regressions, whose dependent variable is 
specified in the first row. Standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered for the 676 investors. Country, time 
and industry (except for model III) dummies, are also included in the analysis but are omitted from the table. 
† p-value<0.1;  *p-value<0.05; **p-value<0.01; ***p-value<0.001. 
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Table 5: Additional evidence: Effect of syndication with GVC 
  I II III IV 
Dependent Variable Young Micro Biotech LowRCI          
Panel A: Syndication with GVC 
FirstRound 1.950 *** 1.077 *** -0.396 * 0.513 * 
 (0.262)  (0.260)  (0.195)  (0.217)  
Centrality 3.944  -15.158 † -2.582  -7.019  
 (3.896)  (8.992)  (3.959)  (4.386)  
VConGDP 9.129 † -9.234  -0.690  -8.593 † 
 (4.813)  (6.738)  (4.040)  (4.941)  
%GVC 6.536 *** 5.243 ** 1.204  0.189  
 (1.599)  (1.802)  (0.994)  (1.630)  
Constant -2.303 *** -1.023  -0.285  -1.884 ** 
 (0.590)  (0.759)  (0.471)  (0.612)  
N 284  202  284  284  
2 1205.30 [16] *** 4441.51 [16] *** 370.19 [11] *** 3234.05 [16] *** 
Pseudo R2 0.417  0.321  0.098  0.362   
         
Panel B: No syndication with GVC 
FirstRound 0.854 *** 1.099 *** 0.263 * 0.054  
 (0.101)  (0.139)  (0.133)  (0.130)  
SyndicatedWithPVC 0.656  -4.236  -1.133  -1.669  
 (2.564)  (3.451)  (2.882)  (3.356)  
Centrality 0.675  -6.871 * -4.596 * -1.110  
 (1.889)  (2.813)  (2.038)  (2.362)  
VConGDP -0.059  -0.382 ** 0.177  -0.031  
 (0.103)  (0.130)  (0.130)  (0.138)  
%GVC 0.633  1.068 * -0.103  1.715 ** 
 (0.457)  (0.503)  (0.503)  (0.557)  
Constant -0.250  0.208  -1.203 *** -1.380 ** 
 (0.242)  (0.333)  (0.287)  (0.460)  
N 955  658  955  955  
2 [DoF] 130.94 [17] *** 609.51 [17] *** 80.67 [12] *** 3355.82 [17] *** 
Pseudo R2 0.116  0.218  0.114  0.379  
The table shows coefficients and standard errors of two sets of four probit regressions, whose dependent 
variable is specified in the first row. In Panel A, only PVC investments in which also a GVC was part of the 
syndicate are included. In Panel B, only PVC investments in which no GVC was involved are included. 
Standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered for the PVC investors. Country, time and industry (except for 
model III) dummies, are included in the analysis but are omitted from the table. † p-value<0.1;  *p-value<0.05; 
**p-value<0.01; ***p-value<0.001. 
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Table 6: Additional evidence: Impact of GVC presence on the characteristics of GVC 
investments 
  I II III IV 
Dependent Variable Young Micro Biotech LowRCI 
FirstRound 1.459 *** 0.373  -0.194  0.531 * 
 (0.271)  (0.272)  (0.200)  (0.215)  
Syndicated -0.612 * -0.909 *** -0.023  0.167  
 (0.247)  (0.255)  (0.153)  (0.197)  
Centrality -126.937  -129.530  74.977  -257.144 *** 
 (78.417)  (78.843)  (66.210)  (74.217)  
VConGDP 5.074  -0.402  5.187  -6.683  
 (3.885)  (6.082)  (3.737)  (4.236)  
%GVC 0.770  1.371 † 0.298  0.709  
 (0.786)  (0.779)  (0.620)  (0.982)  
Constant -0.714  1.231 † -0.850 * -1.634 ** 
 (0.558)  (0.652)  (0.366)  (0.556)  
N 284  174  284  284  
2 [DoF] 975.46 [17] *** 49.11 [17] *** 465.69 [12] *** 676.98 [17] *** 
Pseudo R2 0.269  0.201  0.111  0.385  
Log Likelihood -131.78   -95.867   -153.343   -113.294   
The table shows coefficients and standard errors of four probit regressions, whose dependent variable is 
specified in the first row. Standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered for the 110 GVC investors. Country, 
time and industry dummies (except for model III) are also included in the analysis but are omitted from the 
table. The highest average VIF is 3.89, for model III.  † p-value<0.1; *p-value<0.05; **p-value<0.01; ***p-
value<0.001. 
 
 
